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Law enforcement s undergong rapd change n the areas of recrutment, tranng, technology, mmgraton, and counterterrorsm, among others. How, for example, are polce departments balancng ther daly operatons wth the post-9/11 pressure to prevent and respond to another terrorst attack? Last year, NIJ joned forces wth Harvard Unversty's John F. Kennedy School of Government to take a hard look at these changes and the new demands they are creatng for polce departments. The 3-year collaboraton wll not only help refne NIJ's research agenda, t also wll produce practcal polcy and best practces for polcng.
In addton to the bg-pcture vew of post-9/11 polcng, we are lookng at specfc cases. We know that agences have been asked to shft resources or ncrease spendng-or both-to accommodate new requrements related to counterterrorsm and homeland securty. In 2007, we began an ndepth examnaton of the expanded role of law enforcement agences n fve major ctes to gan a better understandng of the fnancal and operatonal mpacts that these changes have placed on polcng.
NIJ s also ganng expertse from our ongong partnershp wth Israel's Mnstry of Publc Securty. The partnershp culmnated n a 2007 symposum n Jerusalem where U.S. and Israel experts met to fnalze research, whch wll be collected n a jont book on polcng n an era of terrorsm. Release date: 2008.
Other major NIJ accomplshments n 2007:
■ DNA and property crime. We wrapped up a feld experment n fve ctes that looked at the effectveness of usng DNA to solve property crmes and whether dong so helps us catch more dangerous crmnals. Fndngs and recommendatons are due n early 2008.
■ Missing persons and unidentified human remains. NIJ launched NamUs, the Natonal Mssng and Undentfed Persons System. NamUs s the Naton's frst onlne database-avalable to medcal examners, law enforcement, the famles of mssng persons, and the general publc-that wll help solve these dffcult and often cold cases.
■ Gangs. Gang volence poses serous problems for communtes of all szes across the country. We ssued a major solctaton to address the problem.
■ Justice information sharing. NIJ launched a new servce, called the Nlets Interstate Sharng of Photos (NISP), that vastly streamlnes the way law enforcement offcals request a drver's lcense or correctons photo. In the past, the nformaton was avalable only va fax when the department of motor vehcles or correctons offce was open; wth NISP, offcers can receve mages nstantly on ther computers. The servce s beng plot tested n several States.
1 C rme and courtroom proceedngs have long been fodder for flm and televson scrptwrters. In recent years, however, the meda's use of the courtroom as a vehcle for drama has not only prolferated, t has changed focus. In apparent fascnaton wth our crmnal justce process, many of today's courtroom dramas are based on actual cases. Court TV offers lve gavel-to-gavel coverage of trals over the Internet for $5.95 a month. Now, that's "realty televson"! Realty and fcton have begun to blur wth crme magazne televson shows such as 48 Hours Mystery, American Justice, and even, on occason, Dateline NBC. These programs portray actual cases, but only after extensvely edtng the content and ncorporatng narraton for dramatc effect. Presentng one 35-year-old cold case, for example, 48 Hours Mystery flmed for months to capture all pretral hearngs as well as the 2-week tral; the program, however, was ultmately edted to a 1-hour epsode that suggested the crme remaned a "mystery" . . . notwthstandng the jury's gulty verdct.
The next level of dstorton of the crmnal justce system s the extremely popular "realty-based" crme-fcton televson drama. The Law & Order franchse, for example, appears on televson several nghts a week promotng plots "rpped from the headlnes." It and other televson programs pluck an ssue suggested by an actual case and weave a story around t.
The most popular courtroom dramaswhether actual, edted, or purely fctonal-focus on the use of new scence and technology n solvng crmes. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation has been called the most popular televson show n the world. Not only s CSI so popular that t has spawned other versons that domnate the tradtonal televson ratngs, t has also
The 'CSI Effect': Does It Really Exist?
by Honorable Donald E. Shelton Those ratngs translated nto ths fact: fve of the top 10 televson programs that week were about scentfc evdence n crmnal cases. Together, they amassed more than 100 mllon vewers.
How many of those vewers reported for jury duty the next day?
Claims and Commonly Held Beliefs
Many attorneys, judges, and journalsts have clamed that watchng televson programs lke CSI has caused jurors to wrongfully acqut gulty defendants when no scentfc evdence has been presented. The mass meda quckly pcked up on these complants. Ths so-called effect was promptly dubbed the "CSI effect," layng much of the blame on the popular televson seres and ts progeny.
I once heard a juror complan that the prosecuton had not done a thorough job because "they ddn't even dust the lawn for fngerprnts." As one dstrct attorney put t, "Jurors now expect us to have a DNA test for just about every case. They expect us to have the most advanced technology possble, and they expect t to look lke t does on televson."
But s ths really the expectaton of today's jurors? And f so, s t the fault of CSI and ts lk?
To date, the lmted evdence that we have had on ths ssue has been largely anecdotal, based prmarly on prosecutor ntervews wth jurors after trals. Now, however, we have some fndngs based on a formal study that two researchers and I recently performed.
Gregg Barak, Ph.D., and Young Km, Ph.D., crmnology professors at Eastern Mchgan Unversty, and I surveyed 1,000 jurors pror to ther partcpaton n tral processes. The prospectve jurors were questoned regardng ther expectatons and demands for scentfc evdence and ther televsonwatchng habts, ncludng CSI and smlar programs. Our goal was to determne f there was any emprcal evdence behnd the commonly held belefs that juror expectatons for forensc evdenceand ther demand for t as a condton for convcton-are lnked to watchng lawrelated televson shows.
What Programs Do Jurors Watch?
In June, July, and August 2006, a wrtten questonnare was completed by 1,027 randomly summoned jurors n Ann Arbor, Mchgan. The potental jurors, who completed the survey pror to any jury selecton, were assured that ther responses were anonymous and unrelated to ther possble selecton as a juror.
Frst, we obtaned demographc nformaton and asked the prospectve jurors about ther televson-vewng habts, ncludng the programs they watched, how often, and how "real" they thought the programs were. Then, we tred to determne what these potental jurors expected to see n terms of evdence from the prosecutor.
The survey asked questons about seven types of cases:
1. Every crmnal case.
2. Murder or attempted murder.
3. Physcal assault of any knd.
Many attorneys, judges, and journalists have claimed that watching television programs like
CsI has caused jurors to wrongfully acquit guilty defendants when no scientific evidence is presented. 4 . Rape or other crmnal sexual conduct.
5. Breakng and enterng.
6. Any theft case.
7. Any crme nvolvng a gun.
Wth respect to each of these categores of crmes, we then asked what types of evdence the prospectve jurors expected to see:
■ Eyewtness testmony from the alleged vctm.
■ Eyewtness testmony from at least one other wtness.
■ Crcumstantal evdence.
■ Scentfc evdence of some knd.
■ DNA evdence.
■ Fngerprnt evdence.
■ Ballstcs or other frearms laboratory evdence.
Then, we got to the heart of the matter: not only dd we want to explore jury expectatons regardng scentfc evdence, we also wanted to dscover whether the prospectve jurors would demand to see scentfc evdence before they would fnd a defendant gulty.
We asked the survey partcpants how lkely they would be to fnd a defendant gulty or not gulty based on certan types of evdence presented by the prosecuton and the defense. Usng the same cases and evdence descrbed above, we gave potental jurors 13 scenaros and fve choces for each:
1. I would fnd the defendant gulty.
2. I would probably fnd the defendant gulty. 4. I would probably fnd the defendant not gulty.
5. I would fnd the defendant not gulty.
To help ensure that all of the survey respondents were operatng from the same legal gudelnes, we gave them the burden of proof and reasonable doubt nstructons that are gven to all seated jurors n crmnal cases n Mchgan.
Juror Expectations for Forensic Evidence
Dd the survey respondents expect the prosecuton to present some knd of scentfc evdence? Our survey ndcated that:
■ 46 percent expected to see some knd of scentfc evdence n every crmnal case.
■ 22 percent expected to see DNA evdence n every crmnal case.
■ 36 percent expected to see fngerprnt evdence n every crmnal case.
■ 32 percent expected to see ballstc or other frearms laboratory evdence n every crmnal case.
The fndngs also suggested that the jurors' expectatons were not just blanket expectatons for scentfc evdence. Rather, expectatons for partcular types of scentfc evdence seemed to be ratonal based on the type of case. For example, a hgher percentage of respondents expected to see DNA evdence n the more serous volent offenses, such as murder or attempted murder (46 percent) and rape (73 percent), than n other types of crmes. Our fndngs also ndcated that a hgher percentage wanted to see fngerprnt evdence n breakng and enterng cases (71 percent), any theft case (59 percent), and n crmes nvolvng a gun (66 percent The Envelope, Please . . .
It was not a surprse that Law & Order
and CSI were the two most frequently watched law-related televson programs (45 percent and 42 percent, respectvely, of the surveyed jurors). We found that frequent CSI vewers also frequently watched other law-related programs, and those who dd not watch CSI tended not to watch such programs. We also found that CSI vewers, n general, were more lkely to be female and poltcally moderate. Respondents wth less educaton tended to watch CSI more frequently than those who had more educaton.
N I J J o u r N a l / I s s u e N o . 2 5 9
4
As to how "real" a televson program was perceved to be, our results ndcated that the more frequently jurors watched a gven program, the more accurate they perceved the program to be.
What role, then, dd watchng CSI play n the respondents' expectatons and demands for forensc evdence?
Forensic Evidence and Jury Verdicts
For all categores of evdence-both scentfc and nonscentfc-CSI vewers (those who watch CSI on occason, often, or regularly) generally had hgher expectatons than non-CSI vewers (those who never or almost never watch the program). But, t s possble that the CSI vewers may have been better nformed jurors than the non-CSI vewers. The CSI vewers had hgher expectatons about scentfc evdence that was more lkely to be relevant to a partcular crme than dd the non-CSI vewers. The CSI vewers also had lower expectatons about evdence that was less lkely to be relevant to a partcular crme than dd the non-CSI vewers.
Although our study revealed that the prospectve jurors had hgh expectatons for scentfc evdence, the more mportant queston, I beleve, s whether those expectatons were more lkely to result n an acquttal f they were not met. In other words, do jurors demand to see scentfc evdence before they wll fnd a defendant gulty?
Interestngly, n most of the scenaros presented, potental jurors' ncreased expectatons of scentfc evdence dd not translate nto a demand for ths type of evdence as a prerequste for fndng someone gulty. Based on our fndngs, jurors were more lkely to fnd a defendant gulty than not gulty even wthout scentfc evdence if the victim or other witnesses testified, except n the case of rape. 1 On the other hand, f the prosecutor reled on crcumstantal evdence, the prospectve jurors sad they would demand some knd of scentfc evdence before they would return a gulty verdct.
It's Not CSI!
There was scant evdence n our survey results that CSI vewers were ether more or less lkely to acqut defendants wthout scentfc evdence. Only 4 of 13 scenaros showed somewhat sgnfcant dfferences between vewers and nonvewers on ths ssue, and they were nconsstent. Here are some of our fndngs: ■ In the "every crme" scenaro, CSI vewers were more lkely to convct wthout scentfc evdence f eyewtness testmony was avalable.
■ In rape cases, CSI vewers were less lkely to convct f DNA evdence was not presented.
■ In both the breakng-and-enterng and theft scenaros, CSI vewers were more lkely to convct f there was vctm or other testmony, but no fngerprnt evdence.
Hypothesis and Discussion on What It Means
Although CSI vewers had hgher expectatons for scentfc evdence than non-CSI vewers, these expectatons had lttle, f any, bearng on the respondents' propensty to convct. Ths, we beleve, s an mportant fndng and seemngly very good news for our Naton's crmnal justce system: that s, dfferences n expectatons about evdence dd not translate nto mportant dfferences n the wllngness to convct.
That sad, we beleve t s crucal for judges and lawyers to understand juror expectatons for forensc evdence. Even though our study dd not reveal a so-called "CSI effect" at play n courtrooms, my fellow researchers and I beleve that a broader "tech effect" exsts that nfluences juror expectatons and demands.
Durng the past 30 years, scentfc advances and dscoveres have led to a technology revoluton. The development and mnaturzaton of computers and the applcaton of computer technology to almost every human endeavor have been prmary forces n new scentfc dscoveres. At the same tme, new technology has created a revoluton n nformaton avalablty and transmsson. The Internet s an obvous example, and, n many ways, t has been the catalyst for ths ongong revoluton.
Scence and nformaton feed off each other; advancements n scence are fostered by the ablty of scentsts to exchange and transfer nformaton. At the same tme, scentfc developments almost mmedately become avalable not only to scentsts but also to the entre world. It s hardly unexpected that the meda grab scentfc dscoveres and quckly make them part of our popular culture. Many laypeople know-or thnk they know-more about scence and technology from what they have learned through the meda than from what they learned n school. It s those people who st on jures. Every week, the ever-evolvng scentfc and nformaton age comes marchng through the courtroom door n the psyche of almost every juror who takes a seat n the box.
The Jury Is Always 'Right'
Our legal system demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the government s allowed to punsh an alleged crmnal. When a scentfc test s avalable that would produce evdence of gult or nnocencebut the prosecuton chooses not to perform that test and present ts results to the juryt may be reasonable for a jury to doubt the strength of the government's case. Ths realty may seem unreasonable to some, but that s not the ssue. Rather, t s how the crmnal justce system wll respond to juror expectatons.
One response to ths change n expectatons would be to get the evdence that jurors seek. Ths would take a major commtment to ncreasng law enforcement resources and would requre equppng polce and other nvestgatng agences wth the most up-todate forensc scence equpment. In addton, sgnfcant mprovements would need to be made n the capacty of our Naton's crme laboratores to reduce evdence backlogs and keep pace wth ncreased demands for forensc analyses. Another response would be to equp offcers of the court (.e., judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers) wth more effectve ways to address juror expectatons. When scentfc evdence s not relevant, prosecutors must fnd more convncng ways to explan the lack of relevance to jurors. Most mportantly, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges should understand, antcpate, and address the fact that jurors enter the courtroom wth a lot of nformaton about the crmnal justce system and the avalablty of scentfc evdence.
The bottom lne s ths: Our crmnal justce system must fnd ways to adapt to the ncreased expectatons of those whom we ask to cast votes of "gulty" or "not gulty."
NCJ 221501
For More Information ■ Online Training (www.dna.gov).
• What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About DNA EvidenceIssues surroundng DNA evdence and ts collecton for frst responders.
• Principles of Forensic DNA for Officers of the Court-An nteractve program on handlng forensc DNA cases.
• DNA: A Prosecutor's Practice Notebook-A wde spectrum of topcs relatng to the scence of DNA and ts legal applcaton n the courtroom.
• Accordng to a recent study funded by the Natonal Insttute of Justce (NIJ), two of the most popular VSA programs n use by polce departments across the country are no better than flppng a con when t comes to detectng decepton regardng recent drug use. The study's fndngs also noted, however, that the mere presence of a VSA program durng an nterrogaton may deter a respondent from gvng a false answer.
VSA manufacturers tout the technology as a way for law enforcers to accurately, cheaply, and effcently determne whether a person s lyng by analyzng changes n ther voce patterns. Indeed, accordng to one manufacturer, more than 1,400 law enforcement agences n the Unted States use ts product. 2 But few studes have been conducted on the effectveness of VSA software n general, and untl now, none of these tested VSA n the feld-that s, n a real-world envronment such as a jal. who, accordng to ther urne tests, hadwere correctly dentfed by the VSA programs as beng deceptve.
■ Nondeceptive respondents. Eght and a half percent who were tellng the truththat s, ther urne tests were consstent wth ther statements that they had or had not used drugs-were incorrectly classfed by the VSA programs as beng deceptve.
Usng these percentages to determne the overall accuracy rates of the two VSA programs, we found that ther ablty to accurately detect decepton about recent drug use was about 50 percent.
Based solely on these statstcs, t seems reasonable to conclude that these VSA programs were not able to detect decepton about drug use, at least to a degree that law enforcement professonals would requre-partcularly when weghed aganst the fnancal nvestment. We dd fnd, however, that arrestees who were questoned usng the VSA nstruments were less lkely to le about llct drug use compared to arrestees whose responses were recorded by the ntervewer wth pen and paper.
So perhaps the answer to the queston "Does VSA work?" s . . . t depends on the defnton of "work."
What Is VSA?
VSA software programs are desgned to measure changes n voce patterns caused by the stress, or the physcal effort, of tryng to hde deceptve responses. 4 VSA programs nterpret changes n vocal patterns and ndcate on a graph whether the subject s beng "deceptve" or "truthful."
Most VSA developers and manufacturers do not clam that ther devces detect les; rather, they clam that VSA detects mcrotremors, whch are caused by the stress of tryng to conceal or deceve.
VSA proponents often compare the technology to polygraph testng, whch attempts to measure changes n respraton, heart rate, and galvanc skn response.
Even advocates of polygraph testng, however, acknowledge ts lmtatons, ncludng that t s nadmssble as evdence n a court of law; requres a large nvestment of resources; and takes several hours to perform, wth the subject connected to a machne. Furthermore, a polygraph cannot test audo or vdeo recordngs, or statements made ether over a telephone or n a remote settng (that s, away from a formal nterrogaton room), such as at an arport tcket counter. Such lmtatons of the polygraph-along wth technologcal advances-prompted the development of VSA software.
Out of the Lab, Into the Field
Although some research studes have shown that several features of speech pattern dffer under stress, 5, 6 t s unclear whether VSA can detect deception-related stress. In those studes that found that ths stress may be detectable, the decepton was relatvely mnor and no "jeopardy" was nvolved-that s, the subjects had nothng to lose by lyng (or by tellng the truth, for that matter). Ths led some researchers to suggest that f there s no jeopardy, there s no stress-and that f there s no stress, the VSA technology may not have been tested approprately. 7 The NIJ-funded study was desgned to address these crtcsms by testng VSA n a settng where polce ntervews commonly occur (a jal) and askng arrestees about relevant crmnal behavor (drug use) that they would lkely hde. 8 Our research team ntervewed a random sample of 319 recent arrestees n the Oklahoma County jal. The ntervews were conducted n a relatvely prvate room adjacent to the bookng faclty wth male arrestees who had been n the detenton faclty for less than 24 hours. Durng separate testng perods, data were collected usng CVSA ® and LVA.
The arrestees were asked to respond to questons about marjuana use durng the prevous 30 days, and cocane, heron, methamphetamne, and PCP use wthn the prevous 72 hours. The questons and test formats were approved by offcals from CVSA ® and LVA. The VSA data were ndependently nterpreted by the research team and by certfed examners from both companes.
Followng each ntervew, the arrestee provded a urne sample that was later tested for the presence of the fve drugs. The results of the urnalyss were compared to the responses about recent drug use to determne whether the arrestee was beng truthful or deceptve. Ths determnaton was then compared to the VSA output results to see whether the VSA gave the same result of truthfulness or deceptveness.
Can VSA Accurately Detect Deception?
Our fndngs suggest that these VSA software programs were no better n determnng decepton about recent drug use among arrestees than flppng a con.
To arrve at ths concluson, we frst calculated two percentage rates 10 : ■ Sensitivity rate. The percentage of deceptve arrestees correctly dentfed by the VSA devces as deceptve.
■ Specificity rate. The percentage of nondeceptve arrestees correctly classfed by the VSA as nondeceptve.
Both VSA programs had a low senstvty rate, dentfyng an average of 15 percent of the responses by arrestees who led (based on the urne test) about recent drug use for all fve drugs. LVA correctly dentfed 21 percent of the deceptve responses as deceptve; CVSA ® dentfed 8 percent.
The specfcty rates-the percentage of nondeceptve respondents who, based on ther urne tests, were correctly classfed as nondeceptve-were much hgher, wth an average of 91.5-percent accuracy for the fve drugs. Agan, LVA performed better, correctly dentfyng 95 percent of the nondeceptve respondents; CVSA ® correctly dentfed 90 percent of the nondeceptve respondents.
We then used a plottng algorthm, comparng the senstvty and specfcty rates, to calculate each VSA program's overall "accuracy rate" n detectng decepton about drug use. 11 We found that the average accuracy rate for all fve drugs was approxmately 50 percent.
Does VSA Deter People From Lying?
Although the two VSA programs we tested had about a 50-percent accuracy rate n determnng decepton about recent drug use, mght ther very presence durng an nterrogaton compel a person to be more truthful?
Ths phenomenon-that people wll answer more honestly f they beleve that ther responses can be tested for accuracys called the "bogus ppelne" effect. 12 Prevous research has establshed that t s often present n studes that examne substance use. 
Editor's Note

POLygRAPH AND VOICE STRESS ANALySIS: TRyINg TO FIND THE RIgHT TOOL
The valdty of the polygraph as a le-detecton devce has been under fre for years. In 2003, the Natonal Academy of Scences ssued a report dentfyng major defcences n polygraph technology. 9 The report and other analyses led to the research and development of potental alternatves to the polygraph; one technology that emerged s voce stress analyss (VSA).
The Natonal Insttute of Justce funded a study to evaluate two of the most popular VSA software programs n a real-world (that s, nonlaboratory) settng n whch jeopardy-the threat of penaltywas present.
The study found that the average accuracy rate of these programs n detectng decepton regardng drug use was approxmately 50 percent-about as accurate as flppng a con. But the research also found that subjects may be deterred from lyng f they thnk ther responses can be "proven" false.
It remans to be seen, however, f any deterrence factor dsspates as word spreads about the accuracy rate of VSA software programs. Prospectve users of VSA should wegh all these factors, ncludng that there may be an nvestgatve, even f there s no evdentary, use for ths technology.
To determne whether a bogus ppelne effect exsted n our study, we compared the percentage of deceptve answers to data from the Oklahoma Cty Arrestee Drug Abuse Montorng (ADAM) study (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , whch was conducted by the same VSA researchers n the same jal usng the same protocols. The only dfferences-apart from the dfferent groups of arrestees-were that the ADAM survey was longer (a 20-mnute survey compared wth the VSA study's 5-mnute survey) and dd not nvolve the use of VSA technology.
In both studes, arrestees were told that they would be asked to submt a urne sample after answerng questons about ther recent drug use. In the VSA study, arrestees were told that a computer program was beng used that would detect deceptve answers.
Arrestees n the VSA study were much less deceptve than ADAM arrestees, based on responses and results of the urne test (that s, not consderng the VSA data). Only 14 percent of the VSA study arrestees were deceptve about recent drug use compared to 40 percent of the ADAM arrestees. Ths suggests that the arrestees n the VSA study who thought ther ntervewers were usng a form of "le detecton" (.e., the VSA technology) were much less lkely to be deceptve when reportng recent drug use. (See sdebar on p. 10, "Edtor's Note, Polygraph and Voce Stress Analyss: Tryng to Fnd the Rght Tool.") The Bottom Line: To Use or Not Use VSA It s mportant to look at both "hard" and "hdden" costs when decdng whether to purchase or mantan a VSA program. The monetary costs are substantal: t can cost up to $20,000 to purchase LVA. The average cost of CVSA ® tranng and equpment s $11,500. Calculatng the current nvestment natonwde-more than 1,400 polce departments currently use CVSA ® , accordng to the manufacturer-the total cost s more than $16 mllon not ncludng the manpower expense to use t.
The hdden costs are, of course, more dffcult to quantfy. As VSA programs come under greater scrutny-due, n part, to reports of false confessons durng nvestgatons that used VSA-the overall value of the technology contnues to be questoned. 14 Therefore, t s not a smple task to answer the queston: Does VSA work? As our fndngs revealed, the two VSA programs that we tested had approxmately a 50-percent accuracy rate n detectng decepton about drug use n a feld (.e., jal) envronment; however, the mere presence of a VSA program durng an nterrogaton may deter a respondent from answerng falsely. Clearly, law enforcement admnstrators and polcymakers should wegh all the factors when decdng to purchase or use VSA technology. Ths study suggests smulated stress n a laboratory settng may not be suffcent to allow VSA to detect decepton. Ths leads to the argument, by some VSA proponents, that mock decepton n a staged (lab) scenaro fals to create the necessary degree of jeopardy (and therefore stress) to stmulate a measurable response ndcatng decepton. In an experment n whch the subject s not worred about gettng "caught" because there are no real consequences or s pretendng to le, t s, they argue, more dffcult for the software to detect decepton, as the necessary stress levels are not present. Accordng to the edtors of The Crime Drop in America, volent crme n Amerca shot up sharply n the md-1980s, contnued to clmb untl 1991, and then declned over the next 7 years to a level not seen snce the 1960s. The puzzle of how and why ths occurred has gone largely unsolved, they say, despte the attempts of crmnologsts, polcymakers, poltcans, and average ctzens to explan t. The edtors note that explanatons have ranged from mprovements n polcng to a declne n crackcocane use.
The book assembles experts as they seek to dentfy and assess the plausble causes and competng clams of credt for the crme drop. They examne the role of guns and gun volence, prsons, homcde patterns, drug markets, economc opportuntes, changes n polcng, and changng demographcs, wth a prmary focus on urban volence.
Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives
David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga, eds.
Cambridge Studies in Criminology, 2006
Durng the last three decades, Amercan polcng has seen sgnfcant change and nnovaton, wrte the edtors of Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. In a relatvely short tme, they say, polce began to reconsder ther fundamental msson, the nature of the core strateges of polcng, and the character of ther relatonshps wth the communtes they serve. 
An Assessment of the Preparedness of Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond
to Terrorist Attack, a study funded by the Natonal Insttute of Justce, was based on data from the 3-1/2 years after the 9/11 terrorst attacks. It was performed by the Polce Foundaton, the Vera Insttute of Justce, ASIS Internatonal, the Mdwest Research Insttute, Eastern Kentucky Unversty, and Carleton Unversty.
The researchers noted that t s the very nature of retal malls that makes them vulnerable: Large numbers of people, many carryng szeable parcels, come and go through multple entrances and exts, makng t easy for a shooter to blend n wth the crowds. Overseas, open-ar street marketsthe world's orgnal malls-have smlar rsk factors. And natural dsasters, such as fres, tornados, and earthquakes, pose many of the same securty ssues for malls. But regardless of the event-natural dsaster or attack va automatc weapon, bomb, or chemcal or bologcal agent-casualtes n malls can be hgh. The December 5 shootng at Omaha's Westroads Mall left nne dead and fve njured. 2 In our research, Chrstopher Ortz, Robert Rowe, Joseph Broz, George Rgakos, Pam Collns, and I examned the state of prvate securty n U.S. shoppng malls n the post-9/11 world. We found sgnfcant gaps n the emergency preparedness of malls:
■ Very lttle money has been spent to upgrade securty snce 9/11. ■ Rsk assessments are rare, and emergency management plans are frequently developed wthout the nput or partcpaton of frst responders.
There are several steps that could be taken to be better equpped for all emergency stuatons, whether terrorst attack, mass shootng and other volent acts, or natural dsaster. State homeland securty offcals, local polce, and mall owners and tenants all have roles to play n protectng the Naton's malls.
How the Study Was Conducted
My colleagues and I examned whether malls have become better prepared to respond to ncdents snce terrorsts attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11. Our nvestgaton-desgned to go beyond earler surveys on mall securtyconssted of four parts: 
Levels of Mall Preparedness
We asked the State homeland securty advsors to characterze the level of preparedness of large malls n ther States: Of the 33 who responded, 31 percent sad "poor," 24 percent sad "far," 27 percent sad "good," and 18 percent sad "very good."
The most frequently cted reasons for the "poor" ratng were nadequate tranng and equpment, or the opnon that prvate mall securty would be rrelevant durng an attack because the responsblty for response would fall to law enforcement. When asked how retal malls could better prepare, nearly half (15) of the securty advsors endorsed mproved tranng for securty staff and emergency responders.
The need for better tranng was also cted by the mall securty drectors. Ffty-two percent of the 120 who responded sad that ther employees receved specal tranng on preventng and respondng to terrorsm; however, 50 percent also sad that ther mall's antterrorsm tranng was nadequate.
Analysis of State Laws
In our analyss of State laws-whch was performed approxmately 3-1/2 years after 9/11-we found that although 22 States had mandated a mnmum number of hours of general tranng for prvate securty offcers, no State had mandated specfc tranng on preventng or respondng to terrorsm.
Our legslatve analyss also revealed that, at that tme, two-thrds of States requred some level of background nvestgaton for prospectve securty offcers, most commonly a crmnal hstory check. Nearly all mall securty drectors sad they requred crmnal background checks. Slghtly more than half (65 drectors) responded that they also requred drug tests.
Notably, we found that few hrng standards had changed n response to the 9/11 terrorst attacks: only 6 percent of the 120 mall securty drectors who responded to the survey sad hrng standards were made more strngent, and just one n 10 sad they requred addtonal background verfcaton.
Our research ndcated, however, that many malls had made operatonal changes to mprove securty after 9/11. Sxty-three percent of the 120 mall securty drectors reported, for example, that patrol and survellance strateges were modfed post-9/11, wth the most frequently reported change beng the ncrease n securty offcer vsblty.
Sxty of the securty drectors sad ther malls had a closed-crcut televson system, the large majorty of whch (81 percent) were used to montor events n real tme (as opposed to tapng for later revew, f necessary). Thrty percent of the malls had passve barrers, or bollards, to prevent vehcles from breachng the entrance. Nearly half (49 percent) reported that ther staff were nstructed to be on the lookout for unusual behavor or dress of mall clents, ncludng generally suspcous actvty such as takng photos or notes of the facltes, suspcous (such as extra-bulky) clothng, and large or unusual packages.
Nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of the securty drectors reported that they had protocols for securty staff to follow n the event of a dsaster. The same proporton reported that these plans ncluded coordnatng and communcatng wth local law enforcement, fre, and medcal frst responders.
But our research revealed lttle cooperaton n rehearsng emergency response. Only 30 percent of mall securty drectors held exercses to rehearse emergency protocols wth frst responders. Ffteen of the State homeland securty advsors sad they were aware of jont exercses between prvate securty staff n some malls and local polce. Only 13 of the State offcals were aware of jont exercses between mall securty staff and fre or EMT professonals.
U.S. SITE VISITS CONFIRM LACk OF PREPAREDNESS
As part of our assessment of the preparedness of U.S. malls n the post-9/11 world (see man artcle), we vsted eght malls n the Unted States. At each ste, we spoke wth the mall securty drector, local polce, and local fre offcals.
One of the most strkng fndngs was that, at that tme, the malls had not sgnfcantly ncreased ther nvestment n securty after the 9/11 terrorst attacks. Only four stes, whch receved Federal money through the Buffer Zone Protecton Program (BZPP, funds for protectng crtcal nfrastructure), had ncreased securty spendng beyond the rate of nflaton n the 4 years after 9/11; the other four stes had not. In fact, one mall had dramatcally cut ts securty budget.
Fve of the eght malls we vsted had conducted rsk assessments at the nstgaton of the State homeland securty advsor or through the BZPP applcaton process. Wthout undergong some form of rsk assessment, t s dffcult for mall managers to determne what to protect and whch strateges to employ.
Most of the malls had preventon tactcs n place, such as polces desgned to montor and restrct delveres. Securty offcers were vsble throughout the malls and were nstructed to observe suspcous dress and patterns of behavor. Seven of the eght malls had some form of closed-crcut televson, although the systems vared n sophstcaton: Some systems were montored closely; others recorded events for revew only after an event occurred.
All of the malls that we vsted had some form of antterrorsm tranng for securty personnel; however, the programs vared wdely. Most conssted of about 4 hours of classroom tranng that focused on dentfyng potental terrorsts, spottng suspcous packages, and respondng to an attack. We dd not fnd any programs that evaluated what the staff may have ganed from the tranng.
All eght malls had wrtten procedures for respondng to a threat or emergency. Typcal post-threat protocols ncluded lmtng access to crtcal areas of the mall and ncreasng securty personnel. Other procedures covered evacuatons, emergency communcatons, and, n the event of an attack, contactng emergency servces and provdng frst ad.
At that tme, none of the malls had a plan for coordnatng wth frst responders, and only two conducted drlls to rehearse emergency responses. We also dscovered a sgnfcant lack of coordnaton between mall securty and the securty staffs of the mall anchor stores. Only one of the eght malls nvolved tenants n the emergency response plan.
Fnally, we dd not fnd any standards for evaluatng the adequacy of the malls' preparedness plans. Wth no tabletop or lve exercses-and no clear standards for evaluaton-t s mpossble to say how well staff would respond n a dsaster.
More State Involvement Sought
The 120 mall securty drectors reported a low level of support from ther State homeland securty offce n workng to mprove securty. Only 3 percent characterzed ther State advsor as "very nvolved" n plannng, revewng, or approvng mall securty measures. Seventy-eght percent reported that ther State securty advsor was "not at all nvolved."
The mall securty drectors dd, however, report that local law enforcement agences were sgnfcantly more nvolved n mall preparedness than were ther State homeland securty advsors. Two-thrds characterzed ther local polce as beng "somewhat nvolved" n ther securty plannng. Slghtly more than one-thrd (36 percent) reported that ther relatonshp wth local law enforcement had become closer snce 9/11.
The majorty (63 percent) of securty drectors sad they would welcome more nvolvement by State homeland securty offces and local polce, ncludng:
■ Sharng more key ntellgence (40 percent).
■ Conductng rsk assessments or developng emergency management plans (33 percent).
■ Helpng to tran securty offcers (27 percent).
When asked to dentfy the bggest mpedment to mproved mall securty, the majorty of the State homeland securty advsors cted cost and lack of fundng. Only 16 percent of the mall securty drectors sad that ther budgets had ncreased beyond the rate of nflaton snce 2001.
How Can Malls Better Prepare?
Prvate mall securty drectors and State homeland securty offcals could take some steps to mprove emergency preparedness. Our recommendatons nclude:
■ Conductng a formal rsk assessment by experts.
■ Curtalng access to ar crculaton systems and other senstve areas. 3. Although we do not clam that the eght U.S. malls we vsted were representatve of the ndustry, t should be noted that the malls were geographcally dverse: They were located n Calforna, Texas, Wsconsn, and Utah.
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urng Hurrcane Katrna n August 2005, wnds and floods knocked out vrtually every form of communcaton: landlne servce, cellular phone servce, the Internet, and rado transmsson. Even when rado equpment dd work, law enforcement offcals and emergency crews were unable to communcate wth one another because ther rado systems were ncompatble. Ths caused confuson and delay and made t nearly mpossble for offcals to coordnate mssons. 1 Durng emergency stuatons-whether a natural dsaster lke Katrna, large transportaton accdent, or terrorst attack-publc safety offcals from dfferent agences (n some cases, dfferent countes and States) must be able to effectvely communcate wth each other. If they cannot share nformaton quckly, crtcal tme wll be wasted and lves could be lost. Unfortunately, polce offcers, frefghters, and emergency medcal personnel cannot always depend on wreless rado communcatons durng natural dsasters, major accdents, or crmnal actvtes because ther rado systems are often ncompatble.
New technology s emergng that wll enable publc safety offcals to exchange nformaton seamlessly: experts call t "nteroperablty." One of the most promsng of these technologes s software defned rado (SDR) systems.
SDR s a type of rado that uses software to control a rado's operatng parameters and protocols, allowng the rado to be updated and reconfgured, thus mnmzng the need to change exstng hardware. SDR can overcome the challenges of ncompatble communcatons systems by allowng rados to be easly updated wth new functons, protocols, and standards. Most polce rados today cannot be easly reconfgured to mplement new capabltes, and as a result, ncorporatng new communcatons
Software Defined Radios Help Agencies Communicate by Joseph Heaps
technology nto an agency's operatons can take decades. SDR technology has the potental to break that cycle by helpng to ensure that the nvestment a department makes today does not lock t nto lmted solutons for many years. SDR enables new technology to be ntroduced wthout replacng the whole system and allows nteroperablty to be mantaned wthout havng to move all users to the new technology at the same tme.
The good news s that some elements of SDR technology exst n most publc safety rados manufactured today; the bad news s that the full potental of SDR for publc safety communcatons s yet to be realzed. Before ths can happen, sgnfcant techncal, operatonal, and regulatory concerns must be addressed. The Natonal Insttute of Justce (NIJ)-through partnershps and research grants-s workng to help resolve these ssues and accelerate the progress of SDR technology so that publc safety offcals can communcate effectvely wth each other and save lves.
Independent Purchasing yields Incompatible Radios
Tradtonally, local polce departments and other publc safety organzatons make ndependent purchasng decsons for moble communcatons devces. Wth more than 50,000 ndependent organzatons makng these decsons-based prmarly on local factors-t s not surprsng that the feld s flled wth ncompatble communcatons systems. Further complcatng matters, Federal agences do not generally use the same frequency bands as State and local agences, makng t dffcult to coordnate durng a major ncdent.
Sgnfcant strdes have been made n lnkng ncompatble rado systems to mprove frst responders' ablty to communcate. For example, current technology allows the transmsson on one rado system to be rebroadcast on one or more systems. Such rebroadcasts, however, have lmtatons. Transmttng on a separate channel for every connected rado system s an neffcent use of scarce frequency resources. Channels may also be ncorrectly or nadvertently lnked, causng communcaton problems.
Where Does SDR Come In?
SDR technology s ncreasngly fndng ts way nto publc safety products. Some of today's rados use SDR technology to support multple "protocols," whch are the operatng rules for communcaton transmssons. Yet the real future promse of SDR technology s to mplement rados that operate: ■ On multple frequency bands.
■ Usng multple servces, such as two-way rado, cellular, and wreless data.
Multfrequency band rados could nclude software that controls operatng parameters, such as frequency, and allows the rado to be reconfgured, as needed, as one of the three man frequency bands used by publc safety offcals: (1) very hgh frequency, or VHF; (2) ultra-hgh frequency, or UHF; or (3) 800 megahertz (MHz). Ths approach has been mplemented n mltary rados but has yet to be ncorporated n rados used by publc safety personnel. The ntent n the publc safety arena s to allow users to eventually communcate wth systems operatng on frequency bands
AN ANALOgy: HOW DOES SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO WORk?
The basc concept of software defned rado (SDR) s farly smple. Thnk of your home computer. When you want to upgrade some software, you nstall a new program-you would not look to replace your hardware. SDR works n an analogous way: the user upgrades or reconfgures the rado smply by runnng new software, thus mnmzng changes to the actual rado.
other than ther normal "home" systemsfor example, a rado could be developed that ncludes both an 800-MHz capablty used by a cty polce force and a VHF capablty used by sherffs' departments n the surroundng countes.
Software could also be developed to further support nteroperablty by enablng the user to communcate wth other responders usng both voce and data-such as W-F and commercal cellular capabltes-and to confgure the devce to the system needed at a partcular moment. These abltes would allow, for example, responders who are called to a scene outsde of ther coverage area to partcpate fully n the emergency response.
Saving Taxpayer Dollars
Although the major beneft of SDR technology for publc safety s ncreased nteroperablty-and how that translates nto savng lves-other benefts nclude potental cost savngs over the lfe of the rado equpment. SDR would allow polce departments to easly:
■ Upgrade ndvdual peces of equpment wth new features and new communcatons protocols.
■ Upgrade an entre communcatons system.
■ Add new frequences as they become avalable.
Wth respect to upgradng an entre communcatons system, SDR basestatons could communcate va old and new devces untl all equpment s upgraded, or equpment could be confgured as needed durng transton perods. Reprogrammng transmtted over the ar from the basestaton to rados would reduce the labor and coordnaton of physcally reprogrammng rados.
Another sgnfcant beneft of SDR s the enhancement of cogntve capabltes. A cogntve rado, for example, can sense ts envronment and adjust ts operatng parameters accordngly. Although t does not need to be an SDR, the capablty to rapdly adjust operatng parameters n real tme can be mplemented very effectvely through software.
Equipment, Security Challenges
To make SDR technology useful and affordable for law enforcement and other publc safety organzatons, some key ssues must be addressed:
■ Equipment. Antennas and front-end processng contnue to present challenges. Effcent antennas that can smultaneously handle VHF, UHF, and 800-MHz frequences reman too large for portable use. In addton, development must work toward accommodatng dfferent frequency bands.
As the frequency range of bands ncreases, the physcs of the antenna present greater desgn challenges. For example, extendng the range to low-band VHF s partcularly dffcult.
Also, although solutons exst for ncreasng a rado's processng, memory, and power, they add weght and reduce the tme that a battery remans charged, nether of whch s acceptable to publc safety agences. Therefore, addtonal nnovatve processng approaches are needed. 
Working to Advance SDR Technology
To help address these ssues and advance SDR technology for publc safety offcals, NIJ has mplemented a multfaceted strategy.
In 2002, NIJ began to work wth the Software Defned Rado Forum, an nternatonal consortum of organzatons that promote the development and applcaton of publc safety rados. Wthn the SDR Forum, the Publc Safety Specal Interest Groupchared snce ts creaton by an NIJ grantee from the Natonal Law Enforcement and Correctons Technology Center-Northeast (NLECTC-NE)-s workng on two major ntatves:
■ Developng a cost model that wll allow vendors and users to dentfy crtcal prce ponts for SDR and to perform cost-beneft analyses. 
Forensic Information System for Handwriting: FISH
Mantaned by the U.S. Secret Servce, ths database enables document examners to scan and dgtze text wrtngs such as threatenng correspondence.
How does FISH work?
A document examner scans and dgtzes an extended body of handwrtng, whch s then plotted as arthmatc and geometrc values. Searches are made on mages n the database, producng a lst of probable "hts." The questoned wrtngs, along wth the closest hts, are then submtted to the Document Examnaton Secton for confrmaton. For more nformaton, see www.secretservce. gov/forenscs.shtml.
International Ink Library
The collecton-mantaned jontly by the U.S. Secret Servce and the Internal Revenue Servce-ncludes more than 9,500 nks, datng from the 1920s. Every year, pen and nk manufacturers are asked to submt ther new nk formulatons, whch are chemcally tested and added to the reference collecton.
Open-market purchases of pens and nks ensure that the lbrary s as comprehensve as possble.
How does the library work? Samples are chemcally analyzed and compared wth lbrary specmens. Ths may dentfy the type and brand of wrtng nstrument, whch can be used to determne the earlest possble date that a document could have been produced. If the sample matches an nk on fle, a notaton s made n the database. The U.S. Secret Servce generally provdes assstance to law enforcement on a case-by-case bass. For more nformaton, contact 202-406-5708. The two BJS studes offer dfferent data that contrbute to our understandng of the prevalence of prson sexual volence. For years, there were lmted data on the topc, and the few researchers who ventured nto ths complex and controversal area were confronted wth a host of obstacles, ncludng:
■ Low response rate from vctms due to embarrassment or fear of reprsal.
■ Challenges n verfyng vctms' selfreports.
■ Lack of common termnology to descrbe sexual abuse. One of the goals of PREA was to ncrease the data and nformaton on the ncdence of prson rape to help mprove management and admnstraton n regard to sexual volence n correctonal facltes. The law also created an ndependent Natonal Prson Rape Elmnaton Commsson, whch was charged wth studyng the mpact of sexual assault n correcton and detenton facltes and developng natonal standards to address the problem. 
Congress Responds to Prison Rape
When Federal lawmakers wrote PREA, they cted concerns of nadequate tranng of prson staff, under-reportng by vctms, threats to prson securty, and the danger to publc safety posed by abused nmates after they are released. The Act's mperatve was clear: obtan an accurate understandng of the extent and effects of prson rape n Federal, State, and local nsttutons. 6 Takng a multpronged approach, PREA assgned specfc responsbltes:
■ A comprehensve statstcal revew by BJS of the ncdence and effects of prson rape.
■ The creaton of a DOJ revew panel to conduct hearngs, wth subpoena power over offcals who run the three facltes wth the hghest ncdence and the two facltes wth the lowest ncdence of prson rape.
■ The requrement that the Natonal Insttute of Correctons (NIC) provde tranng and techncal assstance and serve as a natonal nformaton clearnghouse.
■ The award of grants-developed and admnstered by the Bureau of Justce Assstance (BJA)-to assst States n mplementng PREA's requrements.
■ The award of research grants by the Natonal Insttute of Justce (NIJ) to address ssues exclusve of the preva-lence or extent of the problem of prson rape, whch the U.S. Congress put on BJA's agenda.
■ The creaton of a Federal commsson to develop natonal standards for the detecton, preventon, reducton, and punshment of prson rape, wth the caveat that the commsson would not be able to recommend standards that would add costs to prson admnstraton. 7 See sdebar on p. 26, "Four Years Later: Progress on Many Fronts."
To accomplsh these goals, annual appropratons of $60 mllon for each fscal year from 2004 through 2010 were authorzed. In the Act, the U.S. Congress ssued a stern warnng to State offcals who demonstrated "ndfference" to protectng prsoners from sexual assault, statng, "States that do not take basc steps to abate prson rape by adoptng standards . . . are not enttled to the same level of Federal benefts as other States." 8 NIJ's work under PREA has yelded mportant research-based evdence to mprove knowledge, practce, and polcy to address sexual volence n prsons. Three major research efforts are dscussed below.
The Nature of Prison Sexual Violence
In 2006, James Austn, Ph.D., and hs assocates at the JFA Insttute ssued fndngs regardng sexual volence n the Texas prson system, 9 the thrd largest prson
THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT OF 2003 DEFINES RAPE
In the Prson Rape Elmnaton Act of 2003, "rape" s defned as "carnal knowledge" (contact between the pens and the vulva or pens and the anus, ncludng penetraton of any sort, however slght), "oral sodomy" (contact between the mouth and the pens, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus), sexual assault wth an object, or sexual fondlng of a person:
■ Forcbly or aganst that person's wll.
■ Not forcbly or aganst the person's wll, where the vctm s ncapable of gvng consent because of hs or her youth or temporary or permanent mental or physcal ncapacty.
■ Acheved through the explotaton of the fear or threat of physcal volence or bodly njury.
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system n the Naton. The researchers chose ths system because t had the hghest rate of alleged ncdents (550 alleged ncdents, for a rate of 3.95 per 1,000 prsoners); on the other hand, t also has one of the lowest substantaton rates (less than 3 percent). In studyng the number and nature of sexual assault allegatons n ths system from 2002 to 2005, they assembled "lessons learned" to help reduce sexual assaults across all correctonal systems.
Among ther fndngs n Sexual Violence in the Texas Prison System:
■ White inmates are attacked more than any other race. Nearly 60 percent of the 43 "sustaned" ncdents-those proven to be true by an nvestgaton-nvolved a whte vctm.
■ Victims are generally younger than their assailants. The average age of vctms n "sustaned" cases was 3 years younger than the assalants. ■ The Bureau of Justce Assstance has awarded more than $10 mllon to 16 States to tran staff, buy and nstall survellance equpment, develop advsory boards, pay for medcal servces for vctms and predators, supply addtonal housng to safeguard vctms, and add sexual assault awareness to nmate orentaton programs. 13 (For more nformaton, see www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bja.) ■ The eght-member Natonal Prson Rape Elmnaton Commsson-whch operates ndependently of the U.S. Department of Justce-has held publc hearngs around the country to, as Congress ordered, "carry out a comprehensve legal and factual study of the penologcal, physcal, mental, medcal, socal, and economc mpacts of prson rape n the Unted States." 14 The commsson s n the process of developng natonal standards for the detecton, preventon, reducton, and punshment of prson rape. (For more nformaton, see www.nprec.us.) ■ Mentally ill or intellectually impaired inmates are more likely to be victimized. Although only 12 percent of the allegatons nvolved a mentally ll or ntellectually mpared prsoner, ths percentage s 8 tmes the proporton of mentally ll nmates n the general prsoner populaton (1.6 percent).
■ Cellblocks with solid cell fronts may contribute to sexual assault. Sold cell fronts, whle permttng prvacy for the nmates and reducng nose wthn the unt, also provde the degree of prvacy that permts sexual assaults to occur. Unlke older prson desgns, n whch the cell fronts consst of bars, sold doors lmt vsual observaton by staff and, to some degree, soundproof the cells to the pont that staff have dffculty hearng what s gong on n ndvdual cells.
The researchers made several recommendatons, ncludng that offcals provde more structured opportuntes to report sexual assault and that prsoners who have been mplcated n such ncdents be closely montored. The researchers also recommended that a better system of categorzng vctms and assalants be consdered and provded a characterstcs checklst for correctonal offcals to use to help dentfy potental vctms and assalants.
The Prisoner's View
In another NIJ-funded project, researchers under the drecton of Mark Flesher, Ph.D., of Case Western Reserve Unversty and Jesse Krenert, Ph.D., of Illnos State Unversty conducted a sococultural study of prson sexual volence n men's and women's hgh-securty prsons across the Unted States. 15 The nvestgators ntervewed a large cross secton of nmates (408 males and 156 females n 30 prsons across 10 States) and allowed them to express ther perceptons on prson sexual volence. In ther report The Culture of Prison Sexual Violence, the nvestgators dentfed major atttudes and belefs that nmates have about prson sexual assault, ncludng:
■ Inmate culture has a complex system of norms on sexual conduct. An act of sexual volence that occurs n one context may be nterpreted dfferently n another context. Interpretaton depends on the pre-assault behavor of the vctm and the assalant, as well as other nmates' perceptons of the causes of the sexual volence.
■ Inmates "self-polce" aganst unwanted sexual predators and mantan protectve relatonshps to facltate safety from physcal and sexual abuse.
■ Inmate sexual culture allows nmates to dsagree on the meanng of sexual volence n smlar contexts. Some nmates may nterpret sexual volence as rape, whereas other nmates may nterpret a smlar act as other than rape.
The response of a vctm toward an aggressor after the act of sexual volence plays a key role n an nmate's nterpretaton of sexual volence.
■ Inmates judge prson rape as detrmental to the socal order wthn the prson communty-prson rapsts are unwelcome.
The researchers offered approaches for observng and supervsng nmates that would help correctonal offcers dentfy sexual aggressors and preempt volent encounters-such as havng offcals observe who prsoners spend tme wth and whch prsoners appear fearful of usng the shower-to gan drect nput on potental parngs of sexual aggressors and vctms. They also recommended orentaton for new nmates that provdes a balanced account of sexual and other types of volence and mproved mechansms for vctms to report rape. 
Correctional Departments Address Prison Sexual Violence
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T h e C o n f e r e n c e Cascarano spearheaded NIJ's early work n dentfyng model crmnal justce programs, documentng them n easy-to-read manuals that were wdely dssemnated, and provdng tranng to polcymakers, local offcals, and managers. One dssemnaton method he used was the regonal tranng workshop: n 1976, for example, Cascarano-drawng on NIJ research about the dffcultes often experenced by rape vctms after reportng crmes-helped develop tranng for polce, prosecutors, emergency room doctors, and ctzens' groups. These sessons often represented the frst tme that such dverse groups of professonals sat down at the same table.
He also spearheaded the effort to make the Natonal Crmnal Justce Reference Servce (NCJRS) the premer nformaton clearnghouse t has become. When he assumed responsblty for NCJRS, ts database ncluded 7,000 documents. Today, the collecton ncludes more than 190,000 publcatons, reports, artcles, and audovsual products from around the Unted States and the world. Durng ths perod, drug problems were escalatng n the Naton's ctes. An NIJsupported plot project n the Pretral Servces Agency n Washngton, D.C., used urnalyss for drug testng arrestees to gve judges mportant nformaton n ther decsons regardng pretral release and condtons to mpose f an arrestee were released pendng tral. To help answer these questons, the Natonal Insttute of Justce (NIJ) assembled researchers, prson offcals, prvate servce provders, and proponents and opponents of prson prvatzaton on March 28, 2007, to dscuss ths complcated and often controversal ssue. At the core of the meetng was a rare occurrence: two cost and performance analyses of the same four prsonsone prvately operated and three publcly operated-wth dfferent fndngs. The two reports are referred to n ths artcle as the "Taft studes." 3 One of the Taft studes was conducted by Doug McDonald, Ph.D., prncpal assocate wth Abt Assocates Inc. (referred to as the "Abt report"). 4 The other study, funded by the Bureau of Prsons (BOP), had two components: a performance or qualty analyss conducted by Scott Camp, Ph.D., a senor research analyst n BOP's Offce of Research and Evaluaton, 5 and a cost analyss conducted by Julanne Nelson, Ph.D., an economst wth the Center for Naval Analyses (referred to collectvely as the "BOP report"). The Taft studes offer the research and publc polcy communtes a rare opportunty to consder the dfferent approaches that were used, why the results were dfferent, and how ths can nform not only the prson prvatzaton debate, but n many ways, the government outsourcng, or prvatzaton, ssue n general.
Making Prison Privatization Decisions
Although every jursdcton has ts own economc and manageral dosyncrases, lessons learned from the Taft studes and the NIJ meetng may help admnstrators and publc polcy analysts avod mstakes that could lead to hgher taxpayer costs and possble dre consequences of poor performance. These lessons nclude:
■ Cost comparsons are decevngly complex, and great care should be taken when comparng the costs of prvately and publcly operated prsons.
■ Specal care should be gven to an analyss of overhead costs.
■ A unform method of comparng publcly and prvately operated prsons on the bass of audts should be developed. There are two prmary reasons why the cost analyses were dfferent: (1) the way nmate populaton szes were treated, and (2) what was ncluded n overhead costs.
Wth respect to nmate populatons, Taft had on average approxmately 300 more nmates each year than the three publcly operated prsons throughout the study perod. Therefore, the prvate servce provder for Taft benefted from economes of scale that reduced average costs. To adjust for such economes of scale, the BOP researchers made adjustments to the expendtures. Wth respect to overhead costs, dfferent approaches by the two research groups led to dfferent fndngs. Basng ts analyss on the extent to whch the government actually provded resources to support the Taft operaton, Abt concluded that only a bare mnmum of support was provded. Therefore, the Abt analyss reported a 100-percent savngs of ndrect, overhead costs for Taft durng the tme perod n the study. BOP, on the other hand, assumed that most overhead costs (plannng, audtng, and other central and regonal operatons) could contnue to be ncurred by the government, even f a prvate company
HOW DID WE gET THE BENEFIT OF TWO STUDIES?
Due to the sheer expense of conductng evaluaton studes, t s a rare occurrence to have competng research analyses lke those dscussed n ths artcle. To understand how ths happened, some hstorcal perspectve s n order.
In 1996, the U.S. House of Representatves drected the U.S. Bureau of Prsons (BOP) to perform a 5-year prson prvatzaton demonstraton project of the lowand mnmum-securty prsons n Taft, Calforna. BOP awarded a 10-year contract to the Geo Group (formerly Wackenhut Correctons Corporaton), whch operated the facltes from 1997 to 2007. The contract was then recompeted, and a new contract to run the Taft prsons was awarded to Management and Tranng Corporaton.
Although the U.S. Congress dd not request a formal evaluaton of the Taft facltes, BOP leadershp decded that an evaluaton of cost and qualty would help them make better decsons regardng prvatzaton. BOP funded the Natonal Insttute of Justce to secure proposals for an evaluaton of Taft and smlar BOP facltes. Abt Assocates won that competton and conducted the study. Because no method exsted for measurng publcly and prvately operated prsons on many dmensons for performance, both of the Taft studes have lmtatons. Untl a common yardstck exsts, any analyss wll not be as rch as t could be. Nonetheless, t s mportant to make whatever performance analyses are possble-n areas such as safety, medcal care, programmng, and rehabltaton servces-when consderng prson prvatzaton.
In the Taft comparson studes, the Abt researchers frst looked at 19 functonal areas-ncludng food servces, health care, safety, and securty-that were specfed n the Taft prvate-servce provder contract. The contract had a scorng system, upon whch possble bonuses and possble deductons would be based: There are two primary reasons why the cost analyses were different: (1) the way inmate population sizes were treated, and (2) what was included in overhead costs.
In ther performance analyses, both the BOP and the Abt researchers also looked at msconduct, comparng assaults at the Taft faclty to assaults at 20 publcly operated low-securty prsons. Both reports found that the Taft assault rate was lower than the average of the 20 prsons; wth respect to the four facltes n the Taft studes, Elkton had an assault rate smlar to what would have been expected based on ts nmate composton; Forrest Cty, Yazoo Cty, and Taft had lower than expected assault rates (Yazoo Cty was the lowest).
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The researchers also consdered drug use, escapes, nmate grevances, and access to medcal care n ther performance analyses. Durng the study perod, Taft had a very hgh drug-use rate compared to the 20 BOP-operated low-securty prsons. Abt noted two escapes at Taft and only two n the BOP prsons; the BOP researchers reported the same two Taft escapes, but also noted a dsturbance at Taft that nvolved 1,000 nmates who refused to return to ther cells for the 10 p.m. count.
Wth respect to access to medcal care, the researchers found that the Taft nmates were more lkely to see a physcan than nmates n the 20 BOP-operated prsons.
Despite Differences, Lessons Learned
Despte dfferences n the approaches and assumptons used by Abt and BOP n the Taft studes, these reports represent two of the best prson prvatzaton analyses performed so far. Admnstrators, polcy analysts, and researchers lookng at prson prvatzaton and the larger publc polcy ssue of government outsourcng would beneft from a closer consderaton of the full reports.
NCJ 221507
Notes
The National Institute of Justice is the research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice.
NIJ's mission is to advance scientific research, development, and evaluation to enhance the administration of justice and public safety. 
